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Abstract
This letter proposes a novel UAV-enabled mobile jamming scheme to improve the secrecy rate of
ground wiretap channel. Specifically, a UAV is employed to transmit jamming signals to combat against
eavesdropping. Such a mobile jamming scheme is particularly appealing since the UAV-enabled jammer
can fly close to the eavesdropper and opportunistically jam it by leveraging the UAV’s mobility. We aim
to maximize the average secrecy rate by jointly optimizing the UAV’s trajectory and jamming power
over a given flight period. To make the problem more tractable, we drive a closed-form lower bound
for the achievable secrecy rate, based on which the UAV’s trajectory and transmit power are optimized
alternately by an efficient iterative algorithm applying the block coordinate descent and successive convex
optimization techniques. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed joint design can significantly
enhance the secrecy rate of the considered wiretap system as compared to benchmark schemes.
Index Terms
UAV communication, physical layer security, mobile jammer, trajectory design, power control.
I. INTRODUCTION
Guarantying the secrecy of wireless communications is a critical issue due to the broadcast
and shared nature of wireless channels. Cooperation based physical layer security has emerged as
a promising solution to improve the secrecy of single-antenna communication systems [1]. One
of the most common cooperative techniques for physical layer security is cooperative jamming
(see [2], [3] and the references therein), where friendly jammers are employed to collaboratively
transmit interfering signals to weaken the quality of the wiretap channel and hence enhance
the secrecy rate. However, conventional static jamming schemes assumed that the locations of
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ground jammers are fixed or quasi-static, thus giving rise to the following two major challenges.
First, the static jammers are not helpful when they are far away from the eavesdroppers, and even
decrease the secrecy rate when they are close to the destination. Second, the perfect instantaneous
channel state information (CSI) of jammer-eavesdropper link is generally required to perform
effective jamming. However, the randomness of terrestrial wireless channels (e.g., shadowing
and small-scale fading) not only degrades the jamming performance, but also makes it difficult
and even impossible to obtain accurate CSI in practice, especially when the eavesdropper is
passive.
Recently, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been increasingly applied in wireless com-
munications [4], such as UAV-mounted BSs [5]–[7], UAV-enabled relaying [8], and UAV-aided
data collection/dissemination due to their many advantages such as cost-effective deployment,
controllable mobility, and line-of-sight (LoS) air-to-ground link. All these features provide new
opportunities to use UAVs as mobile jammers to tackle the above two critical issues in con-
ventional cooperative jamming for ground wiretap channels. First, subject to practical mobility
constraints on the initial/final locations as well as the maximum speed, a UAV employed as a
mobile jammer can opportunistically interfere with potential eavesdroppers on the ground with
more jamming power when it comes closer to each of the eavesdroppers and is sufficiently
distant away from the destination, which helps enhance the jamming performance. Second, the
LoS channel from the UAV to each ground eavesdropper brings the following two benefits as
compared to terrestrial wireless channels. One is that the channel power gain between a UAV
and an eavesdropper can be easily obtained since it only depends on their distance. Note that
the eavesdropper’s location can be practically detected via a UAV-mounted camera or radar.
Furthermore, the channel is significantly less impaired by terrestrial fading and shadowing, thus
making the jamming more effective.
Motivated by the above benefits, we consider in this letter a UAV-enabled mobile jammer for
improving the secrecy rate of a ground three-terminal wiretap channel. Specifically, subject to
both average and peak transmit power constraints as well as the UAV’s mobility constraints,
a joint UAV trajectory design and power control scheme is proposed to maximize a derived
lower bound of the achievable secrecy rate over a finite UAV flight period. To tackle the non-
convexity of the considered optimization problem, an efficient iterative algorithm is proposed
by applying the block coordinate descent and successive convex optimization techniques to find
a high-quality approximate solution. Numerical results verify that the proposed joint design
Fig. 1. A UAV-enabled cooperative jamming system.
achieves significant secrecy rate gain as compared to benchmark schemes without power control
or trajectory optimization. Notice that a secrecy UAV communication system has been recently
studied in [9], while its difference from this letter lies in that the UAV is considered as the
legitimate source in [9] instead of a cooperative jammer as in this letter.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig.1, we consider a three-terminal ground wiretap system where a source S
transmits information to a destination D in the presence of an eavesdropper E. All ground nodes
are assumed at fixed locations which are known a priori. To improve the secrecy rate from S
to D, a UAV is employed as a mobile jammer to cooperatively transmit jamming signals to
combat against the eavesdropping by E over a given flight period T in second (s). Intuitively, a
larger period T in general provides the UAV more time to move closer to E to impose stronger
jamming while keeping farther away from D to cause less interference, and hence helps achieve
a higher secrecy rate.
Without loss of generality, we consider a three-dimensional (3D) Cartesian coordinate system
with the ground user i’s horizontal coordinate denoted by wi = [xi, yi]T in meter (m), i ∈ {S, D,
E}. It is assumed that the UAV flies horizontally at a constant altitude H in m and its initial/final
horizontal locations, denoted by q0 and qF respectively, are pre-determined depending on its
take-off/landing sites or specific mission requirement. Similar to [8], the UAV’s flight period T
is discretized into N equal-length time slots each with duration δt = T/N whereby the UAV’s
trajectory over T can be approximated by a length-N sequence q[n] = [x[n], y[n]]T , n ∈ N =
{1, · · · , N}, which satisfies the following mobility constraints:
‖q[n+ 1]− q[n]‖2 ≤ L2, n = 1, · · · , N − 1, (1a)
‖q[1]− q0‖2 ≤ L2,q[N ] = qF , (1b)
where L = V δt is the maximum horizontal distance that the UAV can fly within each time slot
assuming its maximum speed is V in m/s. Notice that N (or δt) needs to be chosen sufficiently
large (small) such that L is small enough compared with H to ensure that the UAV-ground
channels are approximately constant within each slot.
We assume that the UAV-ground channels are mainly dominated by the LoS link [5], [8].
Thus, the channel power gain at time slot n follows the free-space path loss model as
hi[n] = ρ0d
−2
Ui [n] =
ρ0
‖q[n]−wi‖2 +H2 , n ∈ N , (2)
where dUi[n], i ∈ {D, E} is the distance between the UAV and ground user i in time slot n, and
ρ0 denotes the channel power gain at the reference distance d0 = 1 m.
Both ground channels for the S→ i links are assumed to be independent Rayleigh fading with
the channel power gains denoted by gi = ρ0d
−ϕ
Si ξi, i ∈ {D, E}, where ϕ is the path loss exponent
and ξi is an independent exponentially distributed random variable with unit mean. Note that δt
is generally much larger than the coherence time of ground channels, which are thus assumed
stationary and ergodic within each slot. Let PS[n] and PU[n] denote respectively the information
signal transmit power at source S and the jamming signal power by the UAV in time slot n. In
practice, they are subject to both average and peak power constraints as follows
1
N
N∑
n=1
PS[n] ≤ P¯S, 0 ≤ PS[n] ≤ PSmax, n ∈ N , (3a)
1
N
N∑
n=1
PU[n] ≤ P¯U, 0 ≤ PU[n] ≤ PUmax, n ∈ N , (3b)
where P¯S ≤ PSmax and P¯U ≤ PUmax. Thus, the average achievable secrecy rate in bits/second/Hertz
(bps/Hz) over N time slots is given by [10]
R =
1
N
N∑
n=1
[RD[n]−RE[n]]+ , (4)
with [x]+ , max(x, 0). RD[n] = E[log2(1 +
gDPS[n]
hD[n]PU[n]+σ2
)], RE[n] = E[log2(1 +
gEPS[n]
hE[n]PU[n]+σ2
)],
where E[·] is the expectation operator with respect to ground fading channels, and σ2 is the
independent Gaussian noise power at D or E.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Let Q = {q[n], n ∈ N}, PS = {PS[n], n ∈ N}, and PU = {PU[n], n ∈ N}. Our objective
is to maximize the average achievable secrecy rate R in (4) by jointly optimizing the UAV’s
trajectory Q and the transmit power PS and PU over all time slots subject to UAV’s mobility
constraints in (1) and transmit power constraints in (3). Thus, the optimization problem can be
formulated as
(P1) : max
Q,PS,PU
N∑
n=1
(RD[n]−RE[n]) (5)
s.t. (1), (3),
where the operation [·]+ is omitted since each summation term in the objective function of
(P1) must be non-negative at the optimal solution; otherwise, the optimal value of (P1) can be
increased by setting PS[n] = 0 for any such n without violating the power constraints. Note that
(P1) is still difficult to solve due to its non-convex objective function with respect to Q, PS,
and PU. To simplify the problem, we derive a lower bound for the objective value (achievable
secrecy rate) of (P1), where RD[n] and RE[n] are replaced by their lower and upper bounds,
respectively.
Based on the convexity of ln(1 + ex) and Jensen’s inequality, RD[n] is lower-bounded by
RD[n] =
1
ln2
E [ln (1 +Xn)] =
1
ln2
E
[
ln
(
1 + elnXn
)]
≥ 1
ln2
ln
(
1 + eE[lnXn]
)
,
(6)
where Xn = angD with an =
PS[n]
ρ0PU[n]
‖q[n]−wD‖2+H2
+σ2
. Since Xn is an exponential distributed random
variable with parameter λn = 1ρ0and
ϕ
SD, we obtain by using eq.(4.331.1) in [11]
E[lnXn] =
∫ ∞
0
lnxλne−λnxdx = −lnλn − κ, (7)
where κ is the Euler constant. Substituting (7) into (6), the lower bound RloD [n] of RD[n] is given
by
RD[n] ≥ RloD [n] = log2
(
1 +
e−κγ0d
−ϕ
SD PS[n]
γ0PU[n]
‖q[n]−wD‖2+H2 + 1
)
, (8)
where γ0 = ρ0σ2 . Due to the concavity of the function ln(1 + x), an upper bound R
up
E [n] of RE[n]
is given by
RE[n] ≤ RupE [n] = log2
(
1 +
γ0d
−ϕ
SE PS[n]
γ0PU[n]
‖q[n]−wE‖2+H2 + 1
)
. (9)
With (8) and (9), (P1) can be approximately transformed to the following problem,
(P2) : max
Q,PS,PU
N∑
n=1
(RloD [n]−RupE [n]) (10)
s.t. (1), (3).
Although more tractable, problem (P2) is still non-convex with respect to Q, PS, and PU and
difficult to be optimally solved. Thus, we propose an efficient iterative algorithm to obtain a
suboptimal solution for it in the next section.
IV. PROPOSED ALGORITHM
In this section, we apply block coordinate descent and successive convex optimization to
(P2), which leads to an efficient iterative algorithm. Specifically, problem (P2) is partitioned into
three subproblems to optimize the transmit power PS and PU as well as the UAV trajectory Q
alternately in an iterative manner until the algorithm converges.
A. Subproblem 1: Transmit Power PS Optimization
For any given UAV trajectory Q and transmit power PU, problem (P2) can be written as
(P3) : max
PS
N∑
n=1
[log2 (1 + anPS[n])− log2 (1 + bnPS[n])] (11)
s.t. (3a),
where an =
e−κγ0d−ϕSD
γ0PU[n]
‖q[n]−wD‖2+H2
+1
, bn =
γ0d
−ϕ
SE
γ0PU[n]
‖q[n]−wE‖2+H2
+1
. Although (P3) is non-convex, its optimal
solution can be expressed as [10]
P ∗S [n] =
min([PˆS[n]]
+, PSmax) an > bn,
0 an ≤ bn,
(12)
where
PˆS[n]=
√(
1
2bn
− 1
2an
)2
+
1
µln2
(
1
bn
− 1
an
)
− 1
2an
− 1
2bn
, (13)
where µ is a non-negative parameter ensuring
∑N
n=1 P
∗
S [n] ≤ NP¯S, which can be found efficiently
via the bisection method.
B. Subproblem 2: Transmit Power PU Optimization
Let cn = e−κγ0d
−ϕ
SD PS[n], dn =
γ0
‖q[n]−wD‖2+H2 , en = γ0d
−ϕ
SE PS[n], and fn =
γ0
‖q[n]−wE‖2+H2 . For
any given UAV trajectory Q and transmit power PS, problem (P2) is reformulated as
(P4) : max
PU
N∑
n=1
[
log2
(
1+
cn
dnPU[n] + 1
)
−log2
(
1+
en
fnPU[n] + 1
)]
(14)
s.t. (3b).
Although the objective function of (P4) is non-convex, it is the difference of two convex
functions with respect to PU[n]. This thus motivates us to apply the successive convex opti-
mization technique to tackle the non-convexity of (P4) and obtain an approximate solution.
Define PkU = {P kU [n], n ∈ N} as the given UAV transmit power in the k-th iteration. Since the
first term in (14) is a convex function of PU[n], its first-order Taylor expansion at P kU [n] is a
global under-estimator [5], [8], i.e.,
log2
(
1 +
cn
dnPU[n] + 1
)
≥ Ak[n](PU[n]− P kU [n]) +Bk[n], (15)
where Ak[n] = −cndnln2(dnPkU [n]+1)(dnPkU [n]+cn+1)
and Bk[n] = log2
(
1 + cn
dnPkU [n]+1
)
. With (15), problem
(P4) is approximated as the following problem for any given local point PkU,
(P5) : max
PU
N∑
n=1
[
Ak[n]PU[n]− log2
(
1 +
en
fnPU[n] + 1
)]
(16)
s.t. (3b).
Note that (P5) is a convex optimization problem and can be solved efficiently by standard convex
optimization solvers such as CVX [12]. Since the first-order Taylor expansion in (15) suggests
that the objective value of (P4) at PkU is the same as that of (P5), and (P5) maximizes the lower
bound of the objective function of its original problem (P4), the objective value of (P4) with the
solution obtained by solving (P5) is always no less than that with any PkU.
C. Subproblem 3: UAV Trajectory Q Optimization
For any given transmit power PS and PU, by introducing slack variables L = {l[n] = ‖q[n]−
wD‖2 +H2, n ∈ N} and M = {m[n] = ‖q[n]−wE‖2 +H2, n ∈ N}, (P2) can be written as
(P6) : max
Q,L,M
N∑
n=1
[
log2
(
1+
cn
γ0PU[n]
l[n]
+ 1
)
−log2
(
1+
en
γ0PU[n]
m[n]
+ 1
)]
(17a)
s.t. l[n]− ‖q[n]−wD‖2 −H2 ≤ 0, (17b)
‖q[n]−wE‖2 +H2 −m[n] ≤ 0, (17c)
(1).
It can be verified that at the optimal solution to problem (P6), constraints (17b) and (17c)
must hold with equalities, since otherwise l[n] (m[n]) can be increased (decreased) to improve
the objective value. Similarly, to handle the non-convexity of (17a) and (17b) with respect to
m[n] and q[n], respectively, the successive convex optimization technique is applied where the
terms log2
(
1 + enm[n]
m[n]+γ0PU[n]
)
and −‖q[n]−wD‖2 are replaced by their respective concave upper
bound at a given local point. Define Qk = {qk[n], n ∈ N} as a given initial trajectory in the
k-th iteration; then we obtain
log2
(
1 +
en
γ0PU[n]
m[n]
+ 1
)
≤ Ck[n](m[n]−mk[n]) + F k[n], (18a)
−‖q[n]−wD‖2 ≤ Gk[n], (18b)
where Ck[n] = enγ0PU[n]ln2(mk[n]+γ0PU[n])((en+1)mk[n]+γ0PU[n]) , m
k[n] = ‖qk[n] − wE‖2, F k[n] =
log2
(
1 + enm
k[n]
mk[n]+γ0PU[n]
)
, and Gk[n] = ‖qk[n]‖2 − 2[qk[n]−wD]Tq[n]− ‖wD‖2.
With (18), problem (P6) is recast as
(P7) : max
Q,L,M
N∑
n=1
[
log2
(
1 +
cn
γ0PU[n]
l[n]
+ 1
)
− Ck[n]m[n]
]
(19a)
s.t. l[n] +Gk[n]−H2 ≤ 0, (19b)
(17c), (1).
Since (P7) is a convex optimization problem, it can be efficiently solved by CVX. Similarly, the
upper bounds adopted in (18) guarantee the feasible set of (P7) to be a feasible subset of (P6).
As such, the objective value of (P6) with the solution obtained from (P7) is always no less than
that with any Qk.
D. Overall Algorithm
In summary, the proposed algorithm solves three subproblems (P3), (P5), and (P7) alternately
in an iterative manner by applying the block coordinate descent method until the fractional
increase of the objective value is below a given small threshold,  > 0. As illustrated in
Subsections A-C, the objective values of (P2) with the solutions by solving the subproblems
(P3), (P5), and (P7) are non-decreasing over iterations. Since the objective value of (P2) is
finite, the proposed iterative algorithm is guaranteed to converge.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
To demonstrate the performance of the proposed joint trajectory and power control design
(denoted by “J-T&P”), we compare it with two benchmark algorithms: trajectory optimization
without power control “T/NP” and line-segment trajectory with optimized power control “LT/P”.
Specifically, in “T/NP”, the transmit power of the UAV or S in each slot is set as their correspond-
ing average power, and the UAV’s trajectory is optimized by solving problem (P7) iteratively
until convergence. In “LT/P”, the UAV’s trajectory is designed in a best-effort manner: the UAV
firstly flies towards the location above E, then hovers above E, and finally flies at the maximum
speed to reach its final location by the last time slot. Note that if T is not sufficiently large
for the UAV to reach E, the UAV will turn at a certain midway point then fly towards its final
location at the maximum speed. Therefore, for “LT/P”, the pre-determined trajectory consists of
two line segments, and the power control is obtained by alternately solving subproblems 1 and
2. The parameters are set as follows: q0 = [−100, 100]T m, qF = [500, 100]T m, H = 100 m,
V = 3 m/s, wS = [0, 0]T m, wD = [300, 0]T m, wE = [200, 200]T m, γ0 = 90 dB, P¯U = 10
dBm, PUmax = 4P¯U = 16 dBm, P¯S = 30 dBm, PSmax = 36 dBm, and  = 10−4.
Fig.2(a) shows the UAV’s trajectories versus the period T . The source S, destination D,
eavesdropper E, and the UAV’s initial and final locations are marked with ©,,×,+, and
∗, respectively. It is observed that when T = 200 s, which is the minimum required time for the
UAV to fly from the initial location to the final location at the maximum speed, the trajectories
of the “J-T&P”, “LT/P”, and “T/NP” algorithms are identical. However, their trajectories appear
gradually different as T increases. In particular, when T = 350 s, significant trajectory differences
can be observed for the three algorithms. Specifically, for “T/NP”, it is observed that the UAV
flies along the outermost trajectory and thus spends more time on travelling than that in “J-T&P”,
whereas for “LT/P”, the UAV takes the shortest travelling time. This is because for “T/NP”, the
power control is not considered and thus the UAV tends to keep as far away as possible to avoid
causing excessive interference to D. However, for the proposed “J-T&P”, the UAV is able to
decrease (increase) the jamming power when it flies closer to (farther away from) D. Further, it
is observed that for all algorithms, the UAV first reaches a certain location (not directly above
E for “J-T&P” and “T/NP”), then remains stationary at this location as long as possible, and
finally reaches the final location by the last time slot. This is because these hovering locations
generally strike an optimal balance between degrading the wiretap channel and causing undesired
interference to the destination and hence achieve the maximum secrecy rate in each case.
Fig.2(b) shows the average achievable secrecy rate versus T where the scheme without a
jammer (denoted by “NJ”) is also considered for comparison. It is observed that the secrecy
rates achieved by all algorithms except “NJ” increase as T increases, as expected. Besides, it is
observed that the proposed “J-T&P” algorithm always achieves the highest secrecy rate while
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Fig. 2. Trajectories of UAV-enabled jammer and achievable secrecy rates.
the benchmark “T/NP” achieves even lower secrecy rate than “NJ”. Such results validate the
necessity of joint UAV trajectory and power control design for mobile jamming.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this letter, a mobile UAV-enabled jammer is employed to opportunistically jam the eaves-
dropper, thus improving the secrecy rate of the ground wiretap channel. Specifically, an efficient
iterative algorithm is proposed to maximize the achievable average secrecy rate over a given
finite period, subject to the average and peak transmit power constraints as well as the UAV’s
mobility constraints. Numerical results show that jointly optimizing the UAV’s trajectory with
source/UAV transmit power can significantly enhance the physical layer security performance of
ground wiretap channels.
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